IMAGES OF SWEDEN
Past and Present Perspectives from Austria

AN INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ARRANGED BY
AXEL AND MARGARET AX-SON JOHNSON FOUNDATION
AT PALAIS DAUN-KINSKY, VIENNA ON APRIL 24TH 2017
Front cover: King Gustavus Adolphus’ elk hide buff coat from the Battle of Lützen (1632) Royal Armoury, Stockholm.
Gustav II Adolf at the Battle of Stuhm, by Carl Wahlbom, Nationalmuseum, Stockholm (1853).
Since the Thirty Years’ War in 17th century when King Gustav II Adolf of Sweden ordered a full-scale invasion of the Holy Roman Empire the two countries have always had close, even if not always friendly, relations. Through the Habsburg Empire’s associations with the Swedish court, the welcoming of Crown Prince Bernadotte at the Congress of Vienna, the slow fall of both empires, Schwedenhilfe during and after the First World War and up until the end of the 20th century both countries were greatly effected by the Collapse of the Iron Curtain and a few years later, in 1995, their simultaneous joining with the European Union.

The aim of this international seminar is to look at and understand the different images of Sweden in Austria - both past and present. We will discuss the relationship between the Habsburg Empire, Austria and Sweden from the 17th to the 20th century and the events that shaped them; how did the thirty Years' War effect Austria’s and Sweden's geopolitical outlook? In what ways did the post-Napoleonic era mark a new kind of understanding and closeness? How did a previously belligerent Sweden become a social and political model for Austria?

How were they shaped respectively by turn of the 20th century Modernity? What was the importance of diplomacy, neutrality and not least Social Democracy in securing both countries independence during the Cold War and Post-War period? Have these two parallel societies in Europe in some sense mirrored each other? What is the perception of Sweden in Austrian media today? Is Sweden not quite what it appears in the utopian imagination? And what are the benefits and limitations of an idealised image of Sweden? How have the recent years’ policies on migration and welfare state played out in the Austrian political sphere? In the rapidly changing and volatile political landscape of the 21st century European Union, as well as the world, is Sweden still going to be perceived as an “ideal model”?

This seminar is arranged by Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson Foundation in order to create a dynamic discussion of the image of Sweden as well as the historical relationship between Austria and Sweden and is part of the Ax:son Johnson Foundation’s on-going effort to further the dissemination of scholarly knowledge.
Programme

Monday 24th of April 2017

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12:00 REGISTRATION and LUNCH at Palais Daun-Kinsky
13:10 WELCOME by Kurt Almqvist, President, Ax:son Johnson Foundation
13:15 INTRODUCTION by Rainer Nowak, moderator

The Rise and Fall of Empires

13:20 Perception of Swedes in the Holy Roman Empire by Lothar Höbelt
13:35 Propaganda, Habsburg and Sweden by Anna Maria Forssberg
13:50 The Congress of Vienna - A Turning Point by Monica Kurzel-Runtscheiner

14:05 Making Friends - Schwedenhilfe and Sweden After First World War by Jenny Öhman
14:20 PANEL DISCUSSION, moderated by Rainer Nowak
14:40 COFFEE AND TEA

Bridging the Cold War – Neutrality and Social Democracy

15:10 Kreisky and Palme - On a Political Relationship by Maria Mesner
15:25 Palme, Kreisky, Brandt, and Social Democracy by Anders Ferm
15:40 Austria and Sweden’s Cold War Neutrality by Rolf Ekéus
15:55 20th Century Foreign Relations - A View from Austria by Wolfgang Petritsch
16:10 PANEL DISCUSSION, moderated by Rainer Nowak
16:30 COFFEE AND TEA
Programme

Monday 24th of April 2017

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Schweden Liebe, Modernity and the Image of the Welfare State

17:00 The Odd Couple - Sweden and Austria, Antipodes within the European Family - Impressions of an American Émigré by Allan Janik

17:15 Parallel Views of the Welfare States by Werner Neudeck

17:30 Sweden, a Moral Super Power in Crisis: Historical Roots and Contemporary Challenges by Lars Trägårdh

17:45 From Idyllic State to State of Collapse? by Thomas Gür

18:00 PANEL DISCUSSION, moderated by Rainer Nowak

18:20 DRINKS at Palais Daun-Kinsky

19:00 SEMINAR ENDS
Portrait of Maria Theresa of Austria (1717–1780), painted by Dutch-Swedish painter Martin van Meytens (1695–1770).
BIO: Kurt Almqvist is President of Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson Foundation for public benefit since 1999. He is founder of Axess Magasin (2002) and of Axess Television (2006) which is part of the Foundation's programme Forum Axess, which started in 1999, as well as editor of the Foundation's seminars and books.
The UN Security Council votes on the Admission of 16 new members including Austria to the UN on December 14, 1955.
BIO: Rolf Ekéus is a Swedish diplomat who has spent the last two decades working on international nonproliferation issues. From 1983 until 1989, he served as Ambassador and Head of the Swedish delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and as Permanent Representative of Sweden to the Conference on Disarmament and as Chairman of the international negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention. From 1991 to 1997, he served as Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq. In this post, he was responsible for work to eliminate the Iraqi infrastructure for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. From 2001 to 2007, he served as High Commissioner on national minorities for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. He has held several diplomatic posts, including Swedish Ambassador to the United States from 1997 to 2000 and head of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM).

He was a member of the Advisory Board on Disarmament of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Canberra Commission on Nuclear Weapons and the Tokyo Forum on Disarmament. He serves on the board of the Nuclear Threat Initiative and is Chairman Emeritus of the board of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Ambassador Rolf Ekéus is also a member of the Executive Board for the European Leadership Network (ELN).

SYNOPSIS: There was no surprise that Sweden, one of the few European states having managed to stay neutral during the Second World War, decided not to join the Western Alliance NATO when it was established in 1948. During the Cold War that followed between the Democratic West on one side and the Soviet Union and its allies (defined by the geographic extension of the Soviet Red Army when Germany capitulated in 1945) on the other side, Sweden formulated its policy as a non-alignment with the aim of staying neutral in the case of a breakout of war between East and West in Europe. This policy should be based upon a diplomacy aimed at supporting peace and stability in Europe and maintaining as good relations as possible with the two major powers the USA and the Soviet Union and their allies, and upon a strong military territorial defense capability. That “neutrality policy” was designed to support security and stability in the north of Europe and with special concern for the security and independence of Finland in its relations with the Soviet Union.

In another part of Europe, Austria, having since 1938 and “Anschluss” been a part of Nazi-Germany, was searching for its political identity. Already in 1941 had Stalin
informed his British allies that the Soviet Union would regard the restoration of an independent Austrian republic as an essential part of a postwar order. Later in October 1943 the three allies USA, Great Britain and the Soviet Union jointly pledged to restore Austrian Independence and in 1945 Austria was restored as a democratic republic, though under an occupation dividing the country in four zones ruled by the USA, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union and with the capital Vienna collectively occupied. This arrangement lasted ten years, until 1955 when the Soviet resistance against Austria’s full independence eased. The four occupation powers could 15th May sign a State Treaty through which Austria’s full sovereignty was formally established. All the occupation forces were withdrawn and a constitutional law of perpetual Austrian neutrality was promulgated. To that was added an understanding with the Soviet Union that Austria would not enter into military-political union with Germany.

In December 1955 Austria could join the United Nations. Austria’s new-won independence of the Soviet Union and support for Western democratic values was demonstrated the following year with Austria’s strong reaction against the Soviet Union’s repression of the Hungarian revolution.

The Swedish Government under prime minister Tage Erlander followed closely this development through contacts with Bruno Kreisky who had stayed in Sweden during the war after having fled from Austria after the “Anschluss” to Hitler Germany in 1938. From Sweden he could keep in touch Austrian social democrats. He also established there contacts with other young social democratic politicians having fled from Hitler Germany like Willy Brandt. Already in 1950 Kreisky returned to Vienna and became three years later state secretary in the Austrian Foreign Ministry. In this capacity he could maintain close contacts with Erlander. Their personal relations lasted until Erlander’s retirement as Sweden’s prime minister in 1970. Kreisky came to serve as Austria’s foreign minister from 1959 to 1966 before he became Head of Government, Bundeskanzler, in 1970, a post he could maintain until 1983. Kreisky’s friendship with Erlander extended to Olof Palme who replaced Erlander as leader of the Swedish social democratic party and Sweden’s prime minister.

These contacts were in an international perspective unique. Kreisky brought into the Austrian context a lot of his experiences from the Swedish social democracy which very much differed from the Austrian socialists’ ideas and practices.

However, this was not reflected in the security policies of the two States, in spite of the fact that both were pursuing policies of neutrality in a Cold War context. A basic element in the Swedish policy of neutrality was to stay outside of any political security related commitment like joining the NATO. This was a reflection of the aim of staying neutral in the case of war between East and West. This was a purely national decision, not obligating Sweden to any State or organization. It could also be amended with short notice by a decision in democratic order by parliament and government. The Austrian neutrality, in sharp contrast, was (and is) a constitutional commitment and based upon an international Treaty commitment. This was a firm and stable arrangement which could not be changed.
This possible Swedish political mobility made it necessary for Sweden in its foreign policy to find special ways and means to build credibility around the Swedish intention to pursue a policy of neutrality. Repeated statements of upholding neutrality were not enough. Diplomatically Sweden had to maintain and develop good and stable relations not only to major players in the democratic west like the USA and Great Britain and its northern neighbors, but also towards the Soviet Union. In the latter case Sweden established functioning relations with Moscow through a regular diplomatic dialogue and bilateral meetings on foreign policy matters. Efforts to establish bilateral economic and cultural cooperation were undertaken although with modest results. Before 1955 Sweden had been active in Moscow in support of Austria’s independence. After 1955 the Soviet Union appeared to be less enthusiastic about the Swedish model of neutrality. Obviously the politically based neutrality of Sweden demanded, in contrast to the constitutionally based neutrality of Austria, more of Sweden to assure credibility and consistency as regards its security policy.

Thus Sweden had systematically and effectively worked to strengthen its defense capability, aiming at a strong territorial defense obviously with a Soviet threat in mind. Large financial and personal resources were invested in building a defense with emphasis on high technical quality. For instance the Swedish air force was for a period developed into the fourth most advanced (both in numbers and quality) air force in the world and the navy became modernized and highly effective in its operations in the Baltic Sea. This was made possible through a discreet bilateral military-technical cooperation with the USA outside the NATO context. Furthermore Sweden had a highly secret bilateral exchange of military intelligence with the USA (and partly with Great Britain), also outside the NATO framework. The Soviet Union was probably aware about some of these activities, but appeared to continue to put trust in the fundamentally neutral direction of the Swedish security policy.

However, compared with Sweden’s intentions as reflected in its declared policy of neutrality the Soviet Union obviously more trusted and preferred Austria’s constitutionally based neutrality. There never appeared to be a question of credibility around Austria’s foreign and military policy, a policy which could not be challenged. Another factor of significance in comparing the Austrian and Swedish policy of neutrality was the assessment of the different geostrategic situation of the two states. The North European area with a considerable concentration of NATO forces and a strong Warsaw Pact, Russian mobile military capability concentrated in the many harbors of the Baltic Sea, whether belonging to the Baltic provinces, Poland or East Germany together with concentrated submarines operations, made the Swedish security environment quit tense from both a NATO and Soviet perspective. The Austrian geostrategic environment, a long distance from the Soviet territory raised much less concern in Moscow and also in the NATO headquarters.

Already 1954, the Soviet Union tested a number of ideas about organizing a European Security Conference. It should be the matter of a conference among exclusively European States, thus without the USA (and Canada which also had participated on the European front during the Second World War) but with the participation of
East Germany. Not surprisingly the USA NATO partners dismissed the idea and so did Sweden. The last thing Sweden wanted was a security structure in Europe under Soviet domination. Thus this was an idea doomed to remain in the political ice box for quite a while. However during the early 1970's the tension in Europe eased as a consequence of Willy Brandt’s “Ostpolitik” and a number security policy initiatives which were taken including the launching of the American-Soviet negotiations on the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.

President Kekkonen of Finland took the initiative to host preparatory talks for a security conference in Helsinki with the participation also of the USA and Canada. These talk started in November in 1972 and in July 1973 could Foreign Ministers from 35 States meet in Helsinki to adopt the Helsinki Final Act containing ten principles for the guiding of relations between participating States. The remarkable aspects of this development was that the four neutral States of Europe, Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland came to take the lead in the negotiations on the development of the Final Act which took place in Geneva between 1973 and 1975. This active role was maintained during a series of follow-up meetings i.a. in Belgrade, Madrid and Vienna. The latter was focused upon creating the Stockholm Document 1986 on Military Security Building Measures adding to the corresponding principles of the Helsinki Final Act. This successful deal was followed up in highly important negotiations in Vienna leading to the Vienna Documents 1990, 1992 and 1994. A most important development became the Paris Summit 1990 in which all the heads of state and government participated and signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. Noticeable is that this important document realizing the end of the Cold War was drafted in Vienna during the leadership of the four neutral countries. Vienna and Australia returned in that way to the classical Vienna Conference outlining the peace 1815 after the Napoleonic wars in Europe.
Olof Palme with his son Mattias, Bruno Kreisky and Willy Brandt at Harpsund, (1971).

SYNOPSIS: What united these three statesmen and what did they represent historically, ideologically and politically? A time witness from the inside, Anders Ferm will give his impressions from their discussions and experiences. From Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik ”Veränderung durch Annäherung” to Olof Palme's ”Decolonisation The War in Vietnam and The Third World” and ongoing arms race during the Cold War.
Torstenson im Lager vor Wien, Ziegler, Wien (1846).
BIO: Anna Maria Forssberg born in 1976, is a senior curator at the Army Museum in Stockholm. She is specialized in early modern war propaganda. She presented her doctoral thesis “Keeping the People in a Good Mood: Dissemination of Information, War Propaganda and Mobilisation in Sweden, 1655–1680” at Stockholm University in 2005. Her latest book is “The Story of War. Church and Propaganda in France and Sweden 1610–1710” (2016). In her capacity of research co-ordinator at the Army museum she led a research project on Swedish compulsory military service (the results are summarized in Lumpen. Från Mönstring till muck, Forssberg & Kronberg 2014). She is interested in material culture and the promotion of the use of museum objects in historical research, and has published a manual on this topic (Forssberg & Sennefelt 2014). Forssberg also regularly appears as a historical expert on radio and television.

SYNOPSIS: In May 1618, two imperial representatives and a secretary were thrown from a window of Hradčany Castle by angry Protestants and miraculously survived. This famous Defenestration of Prague was the starting point of a Bohemian rebellion that soon spread to other parts of Europe. The event was also immediately depicted in broadsheets and pamphlets. The media war had begun, and so had the war that we call the Thirty years war. At this point, however, no one knew that it was about to last as long and modern scholars have claimed that it was not one war, but several. It was a power struggle on many different levels. Primarily, the conflict was about the distribution of power in the Holy Roman Empire, and pitted the emperor against the princes. It was also partly a religious conflict, since the former was Catholic and the princes opposing him were Protestant. But the war came to include countries outside the empire too. Denmark and later Sweden interfered more because of their own ambitions than any real enthusiasm for helping their co-religionists, even though their propaganda said otherwise. Religious motives did indeed matter, but often ended up in the shadow of political considerations. The fact that Catholic France sided with Protestant Sweden in an attempt to diminish Habsburg power, is a telling example of this.

During the years 1618–1648 Europe writhed in pain, but also saw the birth of new phenomena. The war can be viewed both as a consequence and a catalyst of the birth of the modern state with its tax enforcement, its bureaucrats and its ambitions to control the subjects. The Thirty years war also meant a media revolution. It is true that Gutenberg had already invented the art of printing and Luther had used the printing presses for his cause, but this war brought something new: the craving for news. “What is new” became the question of the day when news from the front became available
through newspapers, pamphlets and broadsheets. Caricatures, allegories and portraits of kings and field commanders were new commodities. The printed word and the printed image became power factors that all belligerents had to take into account. 

Ferdinand II became emperor in 1619. Even though he was nominally emperor over the Holy Roman empire, his power outside the hereditary lands of Austria, Bohemia and Hungary was limited. Germany consisted of hundreds of small realms, cities and region. Some of them were big and powerful and led by mighty rulers. This is true for the electorates that participated in choosing the emperor. Others were small and insignificant vassal states. The reformation had splintered the European continent. Scandinavia and parts of northern Germany had adopted Lutheranism, and the Netherlands Calvinism, while most of Southern Europe remained Catholic. To prevent conflict an agreement had been reached in Augsburg in 1555 that every prince had the right to determine the religious faith of his dominion, but it did not last. The Bohemian revolt of 1618 was an attempt to preserve the right to perform the Protestant religion, that had previously been achieved. This however, was not accepted by Ferdinand II. The rebellion was crushed and the newly elected king dethroned. This meant that the emperor and the Catholic league had the upper hand in the conflict with the Protestant union. The emperor aimed at a firmer grip and a more centralized empire, and in the first years it seemed as nothing could stop him and his victorious field commander Albrecht von Wallenstein. But tables would eventually turn.

The military successes of Wallenstein and Tilly arouse fear in other part of Europe. All along the 1620's the power holders of Sweden had paid close attention to the events in the Habsburg Empire. Even though Sweden did not enter the war until 1630, preparations were underway much earlier. The Swedish government used various means to inform the subjects of the war and to legitimize a Swedish intervention. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw the evolution of what I have called the ‘system of information’ in Sweden. It consisted of the Church, the Diet, the county governors, and the royal printer. The most important information channel was the Church. The Lutheran faith was fundamental to society and the Swedish king was its head. The pulpits were used for reading aloud the law and for public announcements of all kinds. Before entering the war in 1630 the Swedish king Gustav II Adolf had used both the diet (riksdag) where the peasants were represented and the proclamations of days of intercession (böndagsplakat) to diffuse anti-papal and anti-Habsburg propaganda. According to these texts, the Catholics were hounding the Protestants and waging a religious war. The threat seemed to grow yearly, coming ever closer to home. The propaganda gradually focused more on the threats and misdeeds of the German emperor. The possibility of war was discussed at no fewer than four Diets. The main argument in favour of going to war was that the fighting could easily spread to Sweden anyway and that it was better to attack first in enemy territory. The Diet of 1627 agreed to the war and the taxes that came with it, accepting, as they put it, that it was better to tether the horse in someone else’s paddock and keep war as far from the Sweden’s borders as possible. This was a winning argument in Sweden, since the fear of war within the borders of the
realm was strong after the bitter experiences of previous wars. Swedish troops arrived in Germany in the summer of 1630. They disembarked and established a military camp without meeting any resistance. They also took control over several printing offices and started to publish pro-Swedish propaganda. The favored medium was the illustrated broadsheet – quick and cheap to print and with the ability to reach also people with limited reading abilities. The Swedish propaganda focused to a great extent on the king. He was portrayed as the Christian soldier “miles christianus” or, after Breitenfeld, as the triumphant soldier “miles triumphans”. Portraits of Gustav II Adolf were diffused on broadsheets, but also through other media. The most famous motive is Gustav II Adolf as “the lion of the North”. The propaganda led to Gustav II Adolf being a very popular person in Protestant Germany, but it had a downside: when the king died he left a void that was hard to fill. At the same time the Swedish government worked hard to gain support at home, diffusing information about the war through the church. By the means of days of thanksgiving news from the war was diffused to the people. After the death of the king the image got darker and the main theme was war as divine punishment. The lust for peace also became a recurring theme.

Even though the peace negotiations were supposed to start in 1643, it was not until the summer of 1645 that they began in earnest, after the Swedish victory at Jankau gave them a new urgency. Hostilities limped on, but were marked by war fatigue and a lack of men and means. In the last trembling minutes of the Thirty Years War, Sweden and France used their armies to press for favourable peace conditions. The peace treatises of Westphalia marked a set-back for the emperor’s ambition to gain better control over the empire, and strengthened the position of France. Despite its flaws the document in itself was a remarkable attempt to regulate war and make it more lawful. It was a confirmation of the importance of diplomacy.

As a result of the peace Sweden acquired provinces in Northern Germany and the relationship to the emperor changed. Sweden even sent four companies of soldiers to fight on alongside the Habsburgs against the Ottomans in the war of 1663–64. The war ended in 1664, but the Ottoman Empire continued to play a part in Swedish propaganda, despite the fact that the Ottomans hardly posed a threat to Sweden. After a period of internal instability, the Turks renewed their military efforts in the early 1680’s, laying siege to Vienna in 1683. The city was relieved after three months by an allied Christian force, and the decline of Ottoman influence in Europe then began.

During the siege of Vienna in 1683 a special prayer was said in Swedish churches ‘against the Turk’. When news came that the city had been saved, orders were given that a day of thanksgiving should be held in order to thank God who had brought victory and joy to all of Christendom. The thanksgiving text that was read from the pulpits started with the information that the Swedish king had received a letter from the ‘Roman Emperor’ about a glorious victory against the unchristian and barbarian horde. The good relationship between the Swedish ruler and the Habsburg emperor was emphasised. The credit for the victory was God’s, and it was underlined that the king had ordered the thanksgiving to be celebrated across his realm out of Christian zeal. In the Swedish propaganda, the Catholic foe had been replaced with the Ottomans.
Image of Sweden in the Austrian media (2016).
THOMAS GÜR

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BIO: Thomas Gür is a political commentator, author and consultant specialised on Public Affairs and Media and Investor Relations. He is an editorial columnist at Swedish daily Svenska Dagbladet and member of the Editorial Board of Axess Magazine. He is a pro bono board member of the Swedish NGO Centrum för rättvisa (Center for Justice).
Previously Gür has held positions as CEO of a stock registered company, as a board member and chairman of the board of several SME:s, as Editorial Writer and Foreign Policy Editor at Svenska Dagbladet, as Press officer and Head of Campaign Staff at "Yes to Europe" during the Swedish referendum on the EU-membership in 1994, as Press Secretary at the Ministry of Industry and Commerce under the Carl Bildt-government of 1991, as Manager Corporate Communications at the construction company Siab, as Press Officer at the Commander-in-chief for the Swedish Defense Forces from 1987 -1990 and as Information Officer at the Swedish UN-contingent in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 1984–1986.

SYNOPSIS: In order to make a paradoxical point one could argue that Sweden has always been depicted as an idyllic state and as a state on the verge of collapse, at the same time, regardless the era.

And then one could refer to the period from the end of WWII to the 1970’s when the country was on the acme of its international fame as the middle way between statist socialism and predatory capitalism. Yet dismal images of Sweden as a country of sin, nudity, suicides and drunkenness was disseminated on the international scene during the same years.

A similar point could be made of today by bringing up the contradicting descriptions of Sweden as a country with a strong economy, high level of innovations and patents, and successful enterprises on one hand, and a society characterized by huge problems with immigration, diminishing taxation bases and dysfunctional labour and housing markets on the other hand.

Then once could argue that similar contradicting images of Sweden has always been in swing, but that the truth, with a Swedish saying, “resides somewhere in between”.
However, Sweden as an enhanced welfare state finds itself today in the middle of two major disruptions – the impact of technology and immigration. As one of the countries in the West that has taken most refugees per capita – and a large portion of them unskilled labour – and facing digital technological changes strengthening already existing trends toward job and wage polarizations, the pillars of the Swedish welfare state are wobbling. And the challenges, or rather the problems and the trade-offs, that Sweden now is facing, cannot be easily waved off with intellectualized discourses of recurring paradoxical narratives throughout her history.
Anne of Austria, Queen of Poland and Sweden, (1573–1598).
Lothar Höbelt

BIO: Lothar Höbelt (born 30 June 1956 in Vienna) is an Austrian historian and adjunct professor of Modern History at the University of Vienna. His research areas are political and constitutional history of the 19th and 20th centuries, and the Thirty Years’ War. He also lectures at the Theresian Military Academy. He studied history at the University of Vienna from 1974 to 1981, earning his doctorate *Sub auspiciis Praesidentis* (Promotion under the auspices of the President, the highest level of academic achievement in Austria). He was affiliated with universities in the United Kingdom and the United States, including the University of Chicago, until he was appointed adjunct Professor of Modern History at the University of Vienna in 1997. He once sympathized with the Freedom Party of Austria, but would eventually sympathize more with the Austrian People’s Party under the chancellorship of Wolfgang Schüssel. However, he supported the presidential candidacy of Freedom Party politician Barbara Rosenkranz in 2010 and was the head of her supporting committee.

SYNOPSIS: Sweden only gate-crashed her way into the Holy Roman Empire during the Thirty Years War. From Gustavus I to Gustavus II Adolf Sweden did have close commercial and intellectual links to Germany, but politically she was integrated into German politics mainly as a perennial rival of Denmark who of course had a foothold inside the Empire via Holstein (and diverse bishoprics occupied by Danish princes). *Nota bene*: For a few years a Habsburg princess, Sigismund’s wife Anne, actually was Queen of Sweden. From the 1590’s onwards the conflict within the Vasa dynasty may have heightened Sweden’s desire to control the “altra sponda” of the Baltic Sea, quite apart from the obvious attraction of taxing the grain traffic along the great rivers.

Gustavus Adolph’s invasion of Germany 1630–32 turned into an unprecedented success story. His links with the upper tier of the Imperial estates, the electors, were tenuous at best; but he tapped into a reservoir of aristocratic ambition on a lower level, with princes eager to annex spiritual lands, younger sons of ruling dynasties wanting to establish principalities of their own and members of the intermediate layer of nobles at least trying to make money as military entrepreneurs. Gustavus Adolphus did serve as a focal point for the hopes and aspirations of German protestants whom fortune had not favoured during the early stages of the “German wars”. But too much should not be made of this ideological element. After all, in the long run, the Thirty Years War was part of a hegemonial contest between the two Catholic super-powers, Spain and France.
After Gustavus Adolphus death and the breakdown of the Swedish position in the South of Germany in 1634 Oxenstierna might have preferred to keep the Prussian ports and fight Poland rather than the Emperor. He certainly saw no point in fighting for the sake of untrustworthy German protestants eager to hedge their bets. The Emperor missed an opportunity by not offering Sweden the Pomeranian inheritance right away. Thus, the war against Sweden continued, even though the Habsburgs dearly wanted to concentrate on fighting France. The peace of Prague in 1635 between the Emperor and the German protestants had two drawbacks from the Emperor’s point of view. He was unable to offer any of his new allies’ territory to Sweden and he was no longer able to exploit their lands for the benefit of his armies without restraint. Levying “contributions” the way Wallenstein had done, would no longer do. That sort of exquisite blackmail was now turned into a trademark of Swedish raiders like Königsmarck.

The Swedish army in Germany was a supremely efficient fighting force that almost never lost a pitched battle and managed to turn the war into a huge foraging operation, repeatedly crisscrossing Germany for logistic rather than political purposes. The idea of a separate peace between Sweden and the Habsburgs often resurfaced but was always rejected in the end. Once Sweden dropped out of the alliance she would be on her own, surrounded by jealous neighbours who were likely to gang up on her (as they did after 1700). Her great power status rested on the fearful reputation of the Swedish army in Germany, not on the minute resources of the homeland. At the very least, the army had to be paid off in style so the soldiers would be willing to fight again. While the fighting continued, the army could be bribed with plunder and promises. Once the war stopped, arrears and severance fees had to be paid in cash. That’s why Sweden needed fifteen tons of gold to keep her triple A on the mercenaries’ market (plus an amnesty so there would be no reprisals against German “traitors” and “war criminals” who had supported the “enemy”).

The Emperor could not persuade Sweden to drop her allies. Neither could Sweden and her allies persuade the Emperor to drop his Spanish cousins. That was not a question of sentimental family ties but of endangering his chances of sooner or later inheriting a global empire. In 1645 Torstensson had at least forced the Emperor to start negotiating. But it needed Königsmarck’s coup in surprising Prague in 1648 to make him sign on the dotted line. Peace was made easier because Denmark had in the meantime been compelled to pay most of the price. Denmark was now surrounded by Swedish outposts, from Bremen and Rügen to Skane. Arguably, this arrangement provided an extra margin of security for Sweden. Sweden got Pomerania and her fifteen tons of gold. In contrast to French gains along the Rhine, Pomerania continued to belong to the Empire. The king (or queen) of Sweden was now technically a vassal of the Emperor.

Pomerania was to remain a bone of contention between Brandenburg and Sweden, leading to several wars in the 1650’s, 1670’s, 1710’s and 1750’s. Each time, the Emperor was only marginally involved. (During the Seven Years War, of course,
they even were allies.) Less well known, Sweden did its duty as an estate of the Empire during the war against the Turks after the second siege of Vienna in 1683, when it contributed towards the war effort. There was a famous episode in 1706/07 when Charles XII pursued the Polish king Augustus into his native Saxony. Charles XII used his pivotal position within the War of the Spanish Succession to help the Silesian protestants. He forced the Emperor to reinstate and even extend the concessions that had been granted to them in 1648. When the papal nuncio complained about these favours to heretics, Joseph I is supposed to have answered: “If the King of Sweden wanted me to become a protestant myself, I would not know what to say.”

Ironically, it was the King of Sweden who turned out to be “more popish than the Pope” in the end. When Napoleon forced Francis I to dissolve the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, it was Gustavus IV who protested. A few months later French troops occupied Stralsund. At the Congress of Vienna the Holy Roman Empire was not revived. The German Federation took its place. But Sweden no longer was a member. In a rather complicated arrangement, she had to all intents and purposes swapped Pomerania for Norway.
Austria joins the EU. Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky and Foreign Secretary Alois Mock signing the Accession Treaty to the EU, (1995).
BIO: Allan Janik is citizen of both Austria and the United States, philosopher and historian of ideas, is senior research fellow of the Brenner Archives at the University of Innsbruck and honorary professor of philosophy at the university of Vienna. His international reputation rests upon the path-breaking study *Wittgenstein’s Vienna* published together with Stephen Toulmin, which has been translated into some fifteen languages. However, his interests extend to the nature of professional knowledge, aesthetics and the nature of participatory democracy in Europe. His publications include *The Concept of Knowledge in Practical Philosophy* (in Swedish), *Style, Politics and the Future of Philosophy* as well as the study *Towards a New Philosophy for the EU* (Foundation for Political Innovation 2008). He is an active member of the the European People's Party Brussels think tank, The European Ideas Network.

SYNOPSIS: In the heyday of European socialism during the 1970s Swedish socialists were fond of emphasizing their affinities with Austrian socialists and their achievements in “Red Vienna” in the inter-war years by whom they were strongly influenced in matters of, say, city planning but above all in their common conception of socialism as a cultural and not mere a political ideal. And there were, indeed, a number of similarities that supported the hypothesis: in the friendly solidarity they displayed to one another, in the similarities between the Swedish Model and the Austrian Social Partnership, in the charismatic leadership that two old friends, Olof Palme and Bruno Kreisky, so conspicuously exercised in their respective countries, in their insistence upon neutrality as a bulwark of national identity etc. etc. What was true of socialists and their impressions of one another was equally true generally of the two lands that in fact scarcely thought of each other at all. Swedes, for whatever reason tended to think that Austria was the bigger country when it was in fact smaller; whereas Austrians had a picture of Sweden as dark place where the sun never shined in winter and polar bears traipsed through the streets alongside the “well-oiled” youth that they knew from Austrian winter resorts. Naturally, I exaggerate but not much.

That’s the way that many people I encountered in the 1980s in Sweden seemed to think. Anyway, the laudable similarities that many socialists then perceived were actually scarcely significant in comparison with what separated the two lands: their completely different attitudes to what transpires within the public arena. Swedes demand absolute integrity from their public figures; whereas Austrians are prepared to tolerate, or even expect, disingenuousness on the part of public officials. So a prominent Swedish politician uses an official credit card to pay for a trifling sum for
a private purchase; whereas an Austrian president lies about his past. The former’s otherwise distinguished career comes to a screeching halt; whereas the latter casually finishes his term of office. The moral is: Swedes cannot tolerate the least ambiguity in public life; Austrians simply assume that such ambiguity is always present even to the extent of being offended if it is suggested that such ambiguity might be eliminated from public life. In Sir Karl Popper’s terms the difference amounts to that between an open and a half-open society. In the simplest terms for Stockholmers Sweden is Sweden; for Viennese Austria means Vienna.

Doubtless, these attitudes are rooted in the countries’ respective Protestant and Catholic traditions (NB small “t”) in ways that are definitely identifiable but not so easy explicable in detail. Austrians tolerance of, or, indeed, preference for, theatricality in public life is in one way or another linked to the Baroque tradition in which the country’s culture is so deeply rooted; whereas Sweden’s tradition of enlightenme-

nt bears the mark of Lutheran earnestness. Such attitudes form the background to the most glaring contrast in their respective trade union movements: Swedish unions eagerly accepted technology as a vehicle for progress; whereas Austrian unions tend to be machine-wreckers or at least machine-taxers. In any case, The respective histories of the two countries are a storehouse of fascinating differences that separate the two countries about as completely as two modern western democracies can possibly be separated. Those differences begin with radically different expectations about the comportment of public figures. Swedes have confidence in the public sphere; Austrians do not. Thus Göran Persson could with a stroke of his pen raise the retirement age for all Swedes to 67; whereas a series of Austrian governments has struggled, less than valiantly, it should be said, for to keep Austrians from retiring before 60. Of course, this reflects deeply differing attitudes to work itself. The Protestant Ethic is basically foreign to Austria.

As I have said, in Sweden politicians must mean what they say; in Austria they do not: there is an enormous tolerance for clowns and hysterics in public life as the prominent Franco-Austria Germanist Gerald Stieg has put it; things do not have to mean what they mean. Different religious traditions and different modes of secularization help to explain that but the whole cultural history of the two countries plays itself out along very different trajectories. Underlying Swedish culture is a real sense of belonging to a community, Gemeinschaft, that the German-speaking world like the West in general has lost in the course of industrialization. Swedes love to display their flag privately at their country houses; the Austrian flag is a rarity except at public mountain lodges. Most importantly, consensus in decision-making is the norm in Sweden; conflict is deeply frowned upon. Differences are ironed out quietly before decisions are made. In Austria people thrive on the spectacle of public conflict and grind out compromises grudgingly behind closed doors. Swedes have a sincere collective self-confidence that displays itself inter alia in tolerance of foreigners who are not familiar with Swedish customs; Austrian (Viennese?) tolerance is more polite sang-froid. Sweden is a highly centralized state where the confidence in the public sphere already mentioned manifests itself in a certain confidence in the
government; whereas Austria strongly federal system reflects a deep distrust of Vienna in the provinces and vice versa. That reflects what is perhaps the most important single fact about Austria, today’s Austria came into being as what was left over after the new nation-states were created out of the Dual Monarchy after World War I, as Georges Clemenceau allegedly put it. Neither the Germans nor the Allies would have anything to do with “German Austria” as the state that was created in St. Germain-en-Laye wanted to call itself. Not only unification with Germany but itself the very name was forbidden to Austrian by the Allies. War, lost, war at that, has been the determining character in Austrian political development in the 20th century just all the long period of peace extending from Napoleonic times down to the present has allowed Sweden to maintain its traditional culture through a remarkable period of industrial and post-industrial development.

Despite losing its empire in the 18th century, Sweden has been the dominant power and the dominant culture in the northern Baltic. Centralism was natural in those circumstances Sweden has not fought a war in over two hundred years; whereas Austria has experienced a series of military debacles as well as an ill-fated revolution or two in that period. Austria’s history in the same period, on the other hand is punctuated by wars that have deep scars on the country’s collective psyche and on the psyches of many individuals as well. While lies and secrets (title of a book by Sissela Bok [Myrdal]) are a part of all culture they play a distinctive role in both Swedish and Austrian culture whose comparative differences could only be hinted at in a study contrasting Strindberg’s Miss Julie with Merz and Qualtinger’s Herr Karl. Moreover, certainly after 1871 Austria has been in the shadow of Germany politically and culturally, giving Austrians a touch of an inferiority complex that is wholly unknown among Swedes (the purpose of this extended comparison, after all, is to bring out such differences that emerge sharply in this context when they are less clear normally). Sweden’s ethnic unity and its popular tradition of socialization lend Sweden a monolithic popular culture, most evident to foreigners in matters of dining and toasting that is unknown Austria. Ethnic strife and racism in various forms are endemic to Austria deeply scarring its history in the late nineteenth and twentieth century (Czechs in Vienna, Kärntner place name signs) was until recently marginal in Sweden. The fact that Nowak is the name that most frequently occurs in the Vienna telephone directory is a strong reminder that the city was once the capital of a multi-national empire.

Swedish economic development in the 20th century was the result of an enormously successful policy of industrial development that neutrality in World War II made possible. The socialist notion of applying science to rationalize life – savoir pour prevoir pour pouvoir in the immortal words of Auguste Comte - was successful in ways that the rest of the world could only envy. Despite a strong influence of Austrian socialism upon Swedish socialists, Austria was paradoxically in no way itself capable of similar development except in Viennese municipal politics until late in the twentieth century. Most of the industry in the Dual Monarchy was located in Bohemia. With the creation of Czechoslovakia at St. Germain Austrians found
themselves in a state that was not economically viable because it lost the greater part of its industrial basis. “Anschluß” was the only real possibility for economic survival in the eyes of most Austrians after World War I. There was nothing to be proud about there; whereas Swedes could rightly look to their road out of the Great Depression as a crowning achievement.

This brings us to what is perhaps the most striking point of contrast between Swedes and Austrians: Swedes are proud to be Swedes and proud of the achievements of Swedes and Sweden be they in business, technology or sports; whereas, sports aside, Austrians seldom identify with their country. “Are you an Austrian or are you a Tiroler [Steirer, Kärntner etc]?” says the pseudo-patriot intimating that if you are an Austrian you cannot have a traditional Heimat. This is perhaps the ultimate indication that Sweden and Austria really represent antipodes in modern western culture.
MONICA KURZEL-RUNTSCHEINER

*BIO: Monica Kurzel-Runtscheiner studied History and History of Art in Vienna and Rome. From 1986 to 2000 she was a lecturer in Women’s History at the University of Vienna. From 1993 to 2000 she also was curator at the Kunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna. Since 2001 she is Director of the Kaiserlichen Wagenburg Wien (Imperial Stables) and their montage depots. Kurzel-Runtscheiner is a member of the Austrian Institute of Historical Research, leader of numerous research projects and an evaluator for international research facilities.

SYNOPSIS: In September 1814 monarchs, policy makers and “lobbyists” from all over Europe gathered in Vienna to celebrate the longed-for peace and to reorganize the continent after the fall of Napoleon and the enormous social and political upheavals of the previous decades. At the end of the day, this “conference of princes”, initially planned to last six to eight weeks, continued for nine long months.

For the imperial court and war-scarred Vienna, the Congress was an enormous logistical challenge. Never before or since has a single city welcomed so many sovereigns, politicians and all kinds of “lobbyists” – and never have they stayed so long. Around 200 countries and interest groups had sent almost 700 representatives – among them a Swedish delegation under the direction of Count Löwenhielm. They were joined by countless artists engaged in connection with the festivities and a mass of adventurers and “congress tourists” who had travelled to Vienna to witness this unique get-together of Europe’s leaders. Today it is impossible to determine how many strangers Vienna welcomed: contemporaries speak of up to 100,000 – in a city of circa 250,000 inhabitants! This resulted in an explosion of the prices for lodgings, food, firewood and candles but also in a whirl of festivities and an “inflation” of VIPs who rubbed shoulders with ordinary people on the city’s streets every day.

Supervised by Prince Trauttmansdorff, the Lord Chamberlain, the imperial court began as early as January 1814 (long before Napoleon was finally defeated) to renovate houses and streets, decorate ballrooms, stock up deer parks, as well as to rent lodgings and plan exceptional entertainments for the congress guests.
In addition, thousands of new uniforms were designed and tailored almost overnight, which the Emperor had authorized for the dignitaries, civil servants and footmen of the imperial court in preparation for the Congress. Their elegant designs and rich embellishments reflected the splendour of the imperial court and ensured that the Viennese, who were generally impoverished after 20 years of war, could attend the fes-
tivities arranged in connection with the Congress in suitable attire.

When the Congress finally started in September, thirteen (male and female) members of imperial and royal houses, among them the Russian Czar and the kings of Denmark, Prussia, Bavaria and Wurttemberg, were accommodated at the newly refurbished Imperial Palace (Hofburg). To make space for them the imperial family had to decamp to Schönbrunn Castle outside the city gates. The numerous entourage of the Hofburg-guests as well the princes of smaller countries were housed in city-apartments rented by the court on purpose. As they all were the Emperor’s guests, he not only payed for their lodging, but also for food, service and entertainment of several thousand persons. For the originally planned six to eight weeks, these costs would have been manageable, but when it became clear that the guests would remain far longer, the Viennese joked that this was “a new way to make war: to devour the enemy”.

Another challenge was transport: the noble visitors had journeyed to Vienna in overland travelling coaches, but protocol forbade their use in town. The imperial court therefore needed to find places to park hundreds of travelling coaches for the duration of the Congress, while providing enough elegant carriages for use in town. Count Trauttmansdorff, the Crown Equerry and the son of the Lord Chamberlain, commissioned 170 town carriages, which were built in only a month. In addition, he acquired 700 horses and engaged around 200 additional coachmen for congress guests. The number of carriages was as remarkable as their high quality and design: for the first time in history, they were given a uniform appearance and were thus immediately identifiable as imperial coaches having the right of way.

Despite all these amenities and endless series of glamorous parties, it soon transpired that the victors over Napoleon disagreed about Europe’s political future. Two questions in particular proved highly contentious: the future of Poland - the Russian Czar wanted to secure her crown for himself - and the future of Saxony, to which the King of Prussia laid claim. This Prussian-Russian axis was opposed by Austria, England and the re-established kingdom of France, with the latter trying to prevent the former from becoming too powerful. At meetings and in drawing rooms, at balls, parties and hunts, power brokers grappled with this problem, looking for a compromise while countless committees discussed territorial, social and political topics in the hope of securing a long-term peace for Europe.

The resulting treaty, the final act of the Congress of Vienna, was signed on June 9, 1815. It included a redrawn map of Europe, which brought Sweden the recognition of the annexation of Norway and the loss of Swedish Pomerania. Despite all the shortcomings, the final act was the base for 100 years without major military conflicts in Europe and it set many a precedent: it proclaimed the abolition of slavery in America, free shipping on Europe’s rivers, protection of copyright and the still valid order of diplomatic precedence based on seniority.
The Congress of Vienna, (1815).
**Maria Mesner**

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**BIO:** Maria Mesner was brought up in Braunau am Inn and graduated from the local *Bundesgymnasium* in 1978. After her graduation she studied both History and German Philology as well as Sociology at the *University in Vienna*. After taking her Masters degree (Mag.a phil.) she moved on to the *Renner-Institut* to work as a research assistant until 1999, as a collaborator at the *Department of History* of the Renner Institut at the research centre ”*Vorwärts*” and as of October 1996 as the head of the Department of Sociology and Documentation of the *Renner-Institut*.

In 1994 Mesner took her Ph.D. (Dr. phil.) at the Institute for History at the University of Vienna. Since 1997 she is also lecturing at the Institute for History and Contemporary History at the University of Vienna. In 2004 she was awarded venia docendi for contemporary history (Zeitgeschichte) following her “Habilitation” as a professor at the Faculty for Arts and Humanities at the University of Vienna. Since 2007/08 she also lectures in Gender Studies at the University of Vienna. Since 2000 Maria Mesner is the head of the Bruno-Kreisky-Archive in Vienna.

**SYNOPSIS:** During the 1970's, Bruno Kreisky and Olof Palme were vice presidents of the Socialist Internationale (SI), its chairman being another internationally reknown statesman, Willy Brandt. Kreisky’s and Palme’s relationship is often described as a “lifelong friendship”, although the Swede was more than a decade younger than the former refugee to Sweden Kreisky. The contribution starts from the two men’s biographies and their shared upper middle class background. It traces down the beginnings of this highly political relationship and explores the areas of strategic projects on the international level. It will also ask why and to which extent Sweden served as a model in Austrian politics in the 1970's.
**Werner Neudeck**

*BIO:* Werner Neudeck is a Professor of International Economics at the Vienna School of International Studies (Diplomatische Akademie). Werner Neudeck was born 1954 in Mödling and received his Master in Economics from the University of Vienna in 1976. In 1978/1979 he was a student at the University of Oxford (Campion Hall und NueI College) and in 1980 he received his PhD from the University of Vienna. From 1980 to 1995 Werner Neudeck worked as an assistant professor at the University of Vienna and from von 1983 to 1992 also as Adjunct Professor at the Webster University in Vienna, where he received the Excellence in Teaching Award in 1992. From 1992 to 1999 he was Senior Economist at the International Monetary Fund at the Vienna Institute. 1994 he became AGIP Professor of International Economics at SAIS Bologna Center of Johns Hopkins University and taught there until 1997. Since 1997 Werner Neudeck is Professor of International Economics at the Diplomatischen Akademie Wien and Academic Dean of the joint postgraduate Master Programme (M.A.I.S.) of the Diplomatische Akademie and the University of Vienna.

**SYNOPSIS:** The Austrian welfare state has its roots in the adoption of Bismarck’s conservative social insurance model by the Austrian imperial government at the end of the 19th century. Without changing its fundamental principles, this system was greatly expanded in the 20th century. Today Austrians thus enjoy one of the most generous welfare systems in the EU.

As far as social systems are concerned, Sweden and Austria have much in common. They are similar in population size, in GDP per head, in the size of the state in the economy, in social spending by the government, in the (relatively equitable) distribution of income, and in (usually low) unemployment rates. In all these aspects (except population size) they are well above the EU average. Collective bargaining at industry level and powerful unions play a much more important part in the determination of wages than in other countries. High income levels and generous welfare systems in both countries also lead to similar challenges: Population aging is a particular problem for non-funded pension and health care systems and, recently, Sweden and Austria have become preferred destinations for migrants from many parts of the world. For these reasons, parallel views of the welfare state would appear to be a natural consequence and many authors see Sweden and Austria as major champions of strengthening the “social dimension” of the EU.

There are, however, also major differences in the welfare systems of these two countries. Austria still follows the “conservative” social insurance system which is
financed mainly by social insurance contributions and where benefits are often linked to employment and past contributions. Sweden, on the other hand, subscribes to the “social-democratic” and tax-financed welfare state system, with benefits linked solely to need and citizenship or residence. While the Swedish welfare state relies mainly on in-kind benefits, monetary transfers play a much more important role in Austria. In health care, the Austrian system leads to a complicated and not always efficient sharing of responsibilities between social insurance funds, regions, and communities. The Austrian pension system, on the other hand, seems to encourage people to retire much earlier than in Sweden.

Is (or was) the Swedish welfare state a model for Austria? In the 1960’s and 70's (when Sweden was much richer and had higher welfare spending than Austria), the “Swedish model” was certainly much admired by the Austrian Socialist Party, and many reforms in the Kreisky era were inspired by the Swedish example.

More recently, the conservative Austrian People's Party tends to see Sweden’s welfare reforms in the 90's as a model for Austria, in particular the streamlining of the social insurance funds and the successful incentive measures to increase the retirement age. In conclusion it is clear that both Austria and Sweden are prosperous countries with rather big and generous social welfare systems facing similar problems. Their welfare systems are organized in rather different ways, however. By many, Sweden is still seen as a positive example to be followed. (This is partly explained by the fact that the country was much richer than Austria for most of the 20th century.)
BIO: Rainer Nowak. Date of birth: 25. November, 1972
Place of birth: Innsbruck Nationality: Austria

1992 General qualification for university entrance
1992–1997 Study of history and political science (without completing)

Rainer Nowak started working as a journalist in 1994. 1996 he joined “Die Presse” as an editor, since 2004 he serves as editor-in-chief, since 1st October 2014 also as publisher.

Awards/prizes:
2005 “Staatspreis für Geistige Landesverteidigung“
2013 “Kurt-Vorhofer-Preis“
2014 Chefredakteur des Jahres
2015 Journalist des Jahres
Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann, German Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel, Mayor of Vienna Michael Häupl, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls, Sweden’s Prime Minister Stefan Löfven and President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz at the Federal Chancellery in Vienna, Austria, on Sept. 18, 2014.
WOLFGANG PETRITSCH

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**BIO:** Wolfgang Petritsch, President of the Austrian Marshallplan Foundation, was the Press Secretary to Federal Chancellor Bruno Kreisky (1977–1983), whose best selling biography he published in 2010. Mr Petritsch was the EU’s Special Envoy for Kosovo (1998–1999), EU chief negotiator at the Kosovo peace talks in Rambouillet and Paris (1999), and High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina (1999–2002).

He served as the Austrian ambassador to Yugolsavia, the UN in Geneva (2002–2008) and to the OECD in Paris (2008–2013). He was the Joseph A. Schumpeter Professor at Harvard University (2013–2014) and a Visiting Professor at UC Berkeley in 2016. Mr Petritsch is the author and publisher of more than two dozen books on the Balkans, the EU and on global issues. He is the recipient of the European Human Rights Award 2006.
A racially motivated attack at a school in Trollhättan, an industrial town about fifty miles north of Gothenburg in 2015 shook a country already experiencing a clash of ideals over immigration.
Lars Trägårdh

BIO: Lars Trägård is a historian who has lived in the US since 1970 while maintaining his personal and professional ties to Sweden. After many years as entrepreneur and businessman, he returned to academic studies in 1986. He received his Ph.D. in history from UC Berkeley in 1993 after living and carrying out research for several years in both Germany and Sweden. Later he taught European history at Barnard College, Columbia University for ten years, and was affiliated with the Institute for the Study of Europe at Columbia University. In Sweden he has served as a guest professor at the University of Linköping, and also conducted a research project at Södertörn University College, which resulted in the book – Är svensken människa? Gemenskap och oberoende i det moderna Sverige (2006, pocket 2009) – co-written with Henrik Berggren. Currently he divides his time between the US and Europe. In the US he is working on several long-term projects, including one on “litigation as politics by other means” that is focused on the intersection on law, power and politics in the US and Europe.

In Sweden he is affiliated with the Ersta Sköndal University College where he works both on individual projects – one concerning on children’s rights regimes in Sweden, France, and the United States, and another on state and civil society relations – and on a major collective research project on social trust for which he serves as co-director. He has also appeared on Swedish radio and TV and published frequently in Swedish print media, establishing a role as a public commentator on Swedish and American politics and society.

SYNOPSIS: Sweden has long been known for both for its domestic welfare state and its embrace of international, humanitarian ideals. For many years expansive social investments in Sweden and ambitious development projects across the globe seemed to be part and parcel of a unified commitment to solidarity and equality at home and human rights and development aid abroad. The first ideal is based on the idea of citizenship and national community. The Swedish social contract is in this sense rather straightforward: an alliance between state and citizens, whereby citizens work, pay taxes and earn their fundamental social rights. It is a combination of a national solidarity project, an egalitarian social investment scheme, and a giant insurance company. In this guise Sweden became famous as the quintessential welfare state; as early as the 1930’s both Swedish politicians and foreign journalists began to promote Sweden as a “model” with global, universal claims. To this day Swedish
politicians from the left to the right remain eager to claim ownership of “the Swedish model.” It is also a social contract that enjoys great popularity and legitimacy among the citizens of Sweden.

The second ideal is the notion of human rights (HR), an idea that historically shares roots with citizenship and can be traced back to the founding documents of the American and French Revolutions. After the Second World War, HR and UN inspired internationalism became increasingly important to Swedish international politics and national identity. Not least Dag Hammarskjöld, the second Secretary-General of the UN, and the prominent Social Democratic Prime Minister Olof Palme, came to symbolize Sweden’s special role in this regard. As the commitment to foreign aid and the political support of “third world” countries grew, the idea emerged that Sweden was a country especially devoted to peace and international solidarity. If the United States was the ultimate military power, Sweden was the “moral superpower.” The headquarters of SIDA – the Swedish Development Agency – was Sweden’s answer to the Pentagon.

In other words, there are not one, but two Swedish models, both with strong historical roots and popular legitimacy. It is my contention that while these two models have peacefully co-existed for a long time – thought of not only as compatible but even conceived of as synonymous – they are in fact based on fundamentally divergent solidarity ideals and “rights logics,” one profoundly national, bounded and informed by nitty-gritty Realpolitik; the other explicitly internationalist, unbounded and informed by a starry-eyed idealism.

Furthermore, although both these ideals foreground gender equality and children’s rights as fundamental values, Swedish self-understanding also tends to associate “tolerance,” “diversity,” and “multi-culturalism” as equally central values, which are also flouted as intrinsic to Swedish national identity. Here again a tension is now emerging with brutal clarity in the context of increased migration at home and a new international political climate, in both cases driven by the emergence of a new social media landscape and a more assertive voice from those who do not share the Swedish preference for statist individualism, gender equality, gay rights and children’s autonomy.
**JENNY ÖHMAN**

* BIO: Jenny Öhman has a degree in Education from the University of Gothenburg, a Masters in History from the Universities of Gothenburg and Vienna, and a PhD from the University of Vienna. Her dissertation, “Schwedens Weg aus dem Dreißigjährigen Krieg: Zwischen Subsidien und Separatfrieden 1634–1644”, explores the diplomatic negotiations between Stockholm and Vienna. Currently working in her native Sweden as a secondary school teacher (German / social studies), the Thirty Year War remains the focus of her research and publications, as well as the ‘kyller’ (tunic) Gustav II Adolf wore when he died and the activities of the Swedish voluntary organisations in Vienna after WW1.

SYNOPSIS: The topic I will consider is the origin and activities of the Swedish aid programme in Austria, primarily in Vienna, during and after WW1. Swedish physiotherapists were active in Vienna during WW1. During 1915–16 the Swedish Red Cross (SRK) provided a Swedish ambulance and Swedish doctors and nurses were working in a hospital located on Arzbergerstrasse in Vienna.

Several Swedish women worked for the Red Cross with German and Austrian prisoners of war in countries such as Russia during WW1. After the war, as the news about the unparalleled situation in Europe reached Sweden, many of these women again started to work in different Swedish aid organizations, such as the Swedish Red Cross or in the new founded Swedish Save the Children (Rädda Barnen, SRB).

In the spring of 1919 the Hilfsaktion des Schwedischen Roten Kreuzes für Österreich began. The Swedish aid in Austria was led by the Swedish Red Cross with the activity was led by Swedish envoyé Oskar Ewerlöf. He led the Swedish aid since the organisation was extensive and there was a significant distrust in native aid organizations. The Swedish aid to the new founded republic of Austria was divided in different parts: The three guiding principles of the SRK were: Help to War-Children, maintenance of Austrian organizations aid and the purchase and distribution of food.

On the 10th of May 1919, the first Austrian child refugees arrived by steamboat to Trelleborg in the south of Sweden. The boat contained 460 children, with 169 of Austrian origin. In the following year, 1920, a further 10,000 children arrived in Sweden and more than half of them (5955) were from Austria. Sweden tended to prioritize Austria ahead of other countries as far as gifts, money and clothes were concerned. These undernourished children came to Sweden to reach a healthy weight and in doing so, encountered some unfamiliar food For example, as it was
some of these children’s first encounter with a banana their attempt to eat it was less than successful as they attempted to eat them with the skin intact. In Vienna, “community-kitchens” were established to provide food aid to those in need. Swedish aid organizations cooperated with people like Dr. Eugenia Schwarzwald. SRK, SRB and the Helpcomission also decided to jointly start a Swedish pavilion for children with tuberculosis in Grimmenstein, near Vienna.

The distribution of food and clothes was the principle purpose and activity of the aid organizations. While SRK’s centre of distribution was in Hofburg palace with a workforce of 128 people at its height of activity, SRB’s centre was in the Gonzagagasse, where Elsa Björkman-Goldschmidt led the work until 1924 when the aid organization closed down its work. SRB sent their first delivery of 21 tonnes of clothing, 12 tonnes of food, one tonne of soap in 3 ½ railway carriages to Vienna on the 10th of December 1919.

Vienna expressed its gratitude to Sweden for their efforts in numerous ways. For example, the former Ferdinand III-Square changed its name from the outdated Habsburgers to Schweden-Platz. However, the most valuable and spectacular gift that Austria donated was das Koller (tunic) that Gustav II Adolf wore 1632 in Lützen which Piccolomini brought to Vienna after the battle. The tunic began its journey to its native Stockholm on the 26th of May in 1920 after 288 years in Vienna. Since then it has remained in the National Treasury in Stockholm, where it can still be viewed to this day.
Swedish Red Cross nurse Elsa Brändström, also known as "Angel of Siberia", (1888–1948).
ORGANISATION

President: Kurt Almqvist
Project Leader: Louise Belfrage
Director of Logistics and Planning: Alexander Nyquist
Project Coordination: Erik Ramsgård
Reference Group: Kurt Almqvist, Louise Belfrage
Dr Peter Thyri, Vienna
Dr Martina Winkelhofer, Vienna

Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson Foundation
Stureplan 3, 103 75 Stockholm, Sweden
Telephone: + 46 8 788 50 50
www.axsonjohnsonfoundation.org